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Local Conflict in Indonesia 








The widespread presence of local conflict characterizes many developing countries such as Indonesia. Outbreaks of 
violent conflict not only have direct costs for lives, livelihoods, and material property, but may also have the 
potential to escalate further. Recent studies on large-scale “headline” conflicts have tended to exclude the systematic 
consideration of local conflict, in large part due to the absence of representative data at low levels of geographic 
specification. This paper is a first attempt to correct for that. We evaluate a unique dataset compiled by the 
Indonesian government, the periodic Village Potential Statistics (PODES), which seeks to map conflict across all of 
Indonesia’s 69,000 villages/neighborhoods. The data confirm that conflict is prevalent beyond well publicized 
“conflict regions,” and that it can be observed across the archipelago. The data report largely violent conflict in 7.1 
percent of Indonesia’s lowest administrative tier (rural desa and urban kelurahan). Integrating examples from 
qualitative fieldwork, we assess issues in the measurement of local conflict for quantitative analysis, and adopt an 
empirical framework to examine potential associations with poverty, inequality, shocks, ethnic and religious 
diversity/inequality, and community-level associational and security arrangements. The quantitative analysis shows 
positive correlations between local conflict and unemployment, inequality, natural disasters, changes in sources of 
incomes, and clustering of ethnic groups within villages. The institutional variables indicate that the presence of 
places of worship is associated with less conflict, while the presence of religious groups and traditional culture 
(adat) institutions are associated with conflict. We conclude by suggesting future areas of research, notably on the 
role of group inequality and inference, and suggest ways to improve the measurement of conflict in the village 
census. 
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Headline conflicts such as major instances of civil war, and their ensuing set-backs for 
economic and political development, have in recent years been given increasing research 
attention (Collier 2002; World Bank 2003a).  At the same time, pervasive and widespread local 
conflict characterizes many developing countries such as Indonesia, constituting both a barrier to 
development and, in some cases, providing the fuel for larger incidents of unrest.  Realignments 
in power and resources, and challenges to existing interests and values, phenomena inherent in 
the development process, can lead to increased social tensions (Bates 2000).  As such, major 
political and economic transition often finds states and their societies grappling with ways of 
preventing these smaller instances from escalating into more fully-fledged violent conflict. 
Yet to date, systematic evidence on the presence of such local conflict, and on the 
potential underlying factors that might be associated with this incidence, has been limited.  The 
extent of local violence in a country such as Indonesia  (and variations in conflict incidence, 
type, and impact) suggests that intra-country empirical investigations offer an available starting 
point to a deeper understanding of conflict dynamics.  This paper addresses issues relating to the 
measurement of conflict, and, using a unique census of villages commissioned by the 
Government of Indonesia (the Village Potential Statistics – PODES), investigates associated 
factors that appear to heighten the likelihood of violent local conflict. 
Conflict is a feature of life for many in Indonesia.  The fall of Soeharto’s authoritarian 
New Order in 1998 was accompanied by a wave of violent unrest, which appears to be persistent.  
The old authoritarian regime managed conflict through repression with state structures regulated 
and vertical in nature (cf Tadjoeddin, et al. 2001a), and the army, through its presence in each 3 
and every Indonesian village, quelling any latent unrest.  As Malley (2001) notes, the New Order 
used “coercive bureaucratic and military measures to prevent social tensions from developing 
into open, violent conflicts and to subdue them when they did.” 
High-profile conflict in East Timor, Central and West Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, 
Papua, the Malukus, and Aceh have attracted international attention (Wilson 2001).  However, 
there has been an increasing awareness that many regions of Indonesia are prone to destructive 
conflict (Barron and Madden 2003; Smith 2003; Welsh 2003).  A recent government census of 
more than 69,000 villages and neighborhoods provides a unique opportunity to get a better 
understanding of the distribution of (violent) conflict across Indonesia, to investigate the 
empirical considerations related to tracking local conflict, and to test hypotheses relating to 
factors that may potentially be associated with local conflict.  More than 7 percent of villages 
and neighborhoods in the census reported local conflict during 2002. 
A growing international literature has sought to investigate conditions that affect the 
probability of countries experiencing large-scale violence and, in particular, the likelihood of 
civil war (cf Collier 2002; Humphreys 2003; World Bank 2003a).
1  A range of arguments have 
been put forward as to the potential factors associated with such conflict.  Economic arguments 
have focused on poverty, inequality, property rights, and the process of economic development 
and structure change.  Social arguments have focused on the role of ethnicity and religion.  
                                                 
1 The recent international literature has investigated those characteristics that make countries more prone to 
violence.  The Correlates of War study at the University of Michigan and Pennsylvania State University (Singer 
1990), and the Conflict Data Project at the University of Uppsala (Wallensteen and Sollenburgh 1998) have both 
compiled large cross-national datasets on wars and armed conflicts.  Ted Gurr and Montey Marshall’s work seeks to 
look at which state forms make civil war more or less likely (Gurr, et al. 2001).   4 
Political and institutional arguments have focused on community organization, including state 
versus communal security/policing arrangements. 
Many developing countries are afflicted by high levels of communal and inter-communal 
conflict that does not take the form of civil war, but may yet be the source of significant 
destruction of livelihoods and material property.  In Indonesia, for example, only Aceh would 
fall under Collier-Hoeffler’s definition of civil war.
2  The measurement of local conflict 
incidence for the purposes of more systematic evaluation of variance at low levels of geographic 
specification within countries has remained limited.  Our contribution is meant as a starting point 
toward a better mapping and understanding of local conflicts within Indonesia, and aims to test 
some hypotheses about potential explanatory factors. 
The paper proceeds in four sections.  Section 2 sets out issues concerning the definition 
and empirical measurement of local conflict and lays out hypotheses about the factors associated 
with conflict.  Section 3 describes quantitative and qualitative evidence on conflict in Indonesia.  
Section 4 estimates an empirical model to investigate which factors are associated with conflict 
based on the Indonesian village census.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. Conceptual  Framework 
Conflict is a complex phenomenon that takes on a very wide range of forms.  Major 
instances of civil war entail significant casualties and can set development back by decades.  At 
the other end of the spectrum, conflict is often a productive aspect of everyday interactions that 
                                                 
2 The Collier-Hoeffler dataset focuses on civil war, defined as occurring when an identifiable rebel organization 
challenges the government militarily and the violence results in more than 1,000 combat related deaths, with at least 
5 percent on each side (World Bank 2003a). 5 
does not escalate into violence.  Within this spectrum falls a range of local conflicts that may 
persevere and/or escalate to major instances of violent conflict or even civil war. 
2.1.  Defining and Measuring Local Conflict 
Measuring conflict incidence raises two fundamental issues: (a) the exact definition of 
conflict and the threshold at which an incident is defined as violent conflict within a given 
geographic jurisdiction; and (b) the conditions under which respondents might misreport or mis-
perceive instances of conflict.  Reporting biases relating to conflict are of special concern for 
statistical evaluations if these are themselves associated with some of the factors posited to be 
associated with conflict. 
The Indonesia statistical agency (BPS) has adopted a definition of local conflict beyond 
some threshold of violence within a given locality in the past year, that may have been associated 
with loss of life, serious injury, or property damage.  Localities are rural villages (desa) or their 
urban equivalents (kelurahan).  Responses are compiled from village leaders and central 
government statistical agents (mantri statistik) posted at the sub-district level.  This large-scale, 
quantitative collection of conflict data has its limitations.  Given the challenges of capturing local 
conflict as a discreet incident, our paper explicitly integrates an in-depth qualitative conflict 
mapping exercise conducted in eight sub-districts (Barron, et al. 2004a), as well as comparisons 
with other quantitative data.  We argue that the complexity of conflict, matched by its often 
widespread incidence, requires mixed quantitative-qualitative approaches (cf Rao and Woolcock 6 
2003).  Prior to turning to this discussion, we outline the range of possible factors that might be 
associated with the likelihood of local conflict.
3 
2.2.  Potential Factors Affecting the Likelihood of Local Conflict 
The likelihood that conflict escalates into violence may be affected by economic factors 
including poverty, inequality, and income shocks/uncertainty; frictions between groups (e.g., 
across religious and ethnic group cleavages); and institutional factors (e.g., the extent to which 
violence is effectively mediated or, conversely, sanctioned by the state apparatus, including the 
police, and the legitimacy and effectiveness by which power/leadership is exercised in a 
community) (cf Humphreys 2003).  The exact mechanisms by which these factors might affect 
the likelihood of conflict escalating beyond a certain threshold may be complex and highly 
context specific, as may be the exact pathways toward resolution, stalemate, and escalation 
(Barron, et al. 2004b). 
Observers have emphasized different factors that may be associated conflict, and/or 
which are important to mediate tensions, in the Indonesian context.  They include, but are not 
limited to, unemployment and inequitable development (Barron and Madden 2003), weak legal 
systems (Welsh 2003), the effect of industrialization (Miguel, et al. 2003), decentralization (ICG 
                                                 
3 A growing literature has examined the incidence of crime and various associated economic factors at the 
international (cf Fajnzylber, et al. 2002) and at the local level (cf Demombynes and Ozler 2002).  Crime and conflict 
are often strongly associated.  For example, robberies may trigger conflict; incidents such as murder or rape may 
occur in the context of conflict.  Some of the factors identified in the crime literature, including inequality, may also 
be associated with conflict, although often through different mechanisms.  Whereas crime could be argued to be 
largely based around individuals (with varying degree of organization), instances of local conflict appear to be best 
defined in group/communal terms (Barron, et al. 2004b).  The measurement of crime also faces issues of potential 
underreporting/reporting bias, although phenomena such as property or personal crime incidents can often be 
defined as more discreet events.  While the Indonesian data from PODES also contains evidence of local crime (it 
asks whether stealing, robbery, plundering, torture/violence, arson, rape, use of narcotics and murder took place in a 
village in the past year, and whether levels increased, decreased, or remained the same) we consider an examination 
of this to be beyond the scope of this paper. 7 
2003), lack of clarity in land rights (Bennet 2002), regional economic disparities (Tadjoeddin, et 
al. 2001b), the mis-management of natural resources (ICG 2001; Ross 2002), and the capture of 
economic power by an ethnic group (Chua 2002).  
Table 1 sets out hypotheses about potential factors associated with local conflict.  Our 
hypotheses have been derived from the available international literature and on-going qualitative 
work (Barron, et al. 2004a).  We briefly review these factors and suggest mechanisms by which 
these could be associated with conflict.  Section 4 identifies quantitative proxies for each of these 
hypothesis measures at the village/neighbourhood, sub-district (kecamatan), and district 
(kabupaten/kota) level. 
Table 1: Local Conflict Incidence Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Class  Hypothesis  Proxies 
Economic  Poverty increases conflict  - Consumption based poverty measure defined at 
district level (headcount/”depth”) 
- Relative Poverty of Village (BKKBN) as compared to 
district average (defined using family planning lists) 
- Village level share of unemployed 
  Inequality among individuals increases 
conflict 
- Consumption based Gini coefficient in district 
 
  Sudden loss of local income increases 
conflict 
- Number of poor (according to family planning lists) 
increased in the past year 
- Natural disaster in the past three years 
  Economic development increases conflict  - Does village have electricity? 
- Share of families that work outside agriculture 
- Are there residents who live outside of village for 
work or school? 
- Are there people who live in this village for work or 
school who are not residents? 
- Share of land that changed use in the past three year 
(total, sawah, forestry)  
  Uncertain property rights increase conflict  - Share of privately used agricultural land that is titled, 
non-titled or community land 
- Variables as above cross with land scarcity indicator 
(hectare of agricultural land / population) 
- Mining and/or forestry is main source of household 
income 
Social  Social diversity (ethnicity/religion) 
increases conflict 
- Ethnic or religious diversity in a village 
- Majority religious group in village differs within sub-
district 
- Ethnic diversity in a sub-district or district 
- Ethnic “clustering” across villages within sub-district 
increases conflict 
  What matters is really the types of diversity. 
-  inequalities between groups constitute a more 
potent source of violent conflict than 
inequalities among individuals (Stewart) 
- Number of religious institutions per household in 
village 
- Active faith group is present in the village 
- Differences in educational endowment across major 8 
- What matters is how communal/ethnic 
diversity is mediated through associational 
forms on interaction across groups (Varshney) 
ethnic groups in a sub-district 
- Inter-ethnic marriage exists in village 
- Average Years of Schooling in District 
-Presence of traditional/adat institutions 
Political/Institutional  Lags/resistance in rural democratisation 
increases conflict 
-Villages without a new elected village council (BPD) 
  The absence of community watch 
organization increases the likelihood of 
conflict 
-No community watch present 
  Absence of readily accessible police 
presence increases the likelihood of conflict 
-Distance of nearest police post 
-Nearest police post difficult to reach 
  Leadership characteristics have an 
influence on conflict 
-Female village leadership decreases conflict 
Economic deprivation or disparities in wealth may increase grievances.  Economic 
shocks could lead individuals/groups of individuals to transgress on the property of others (e.g., 
through alleged livestock or petty theft), thereby serving as a trigger for further conflict 
escalation.  Out-migration may denote lack of economic opportunity within a village, or 
indirectly lead to a decline in local social capital as individuals invest less in community 
associations as they expect their future to be elsewhere (Miguel, et al. 2003).  Structural 
transformation away from (particularly subsistence) agriculture may increase uncertainty over 
incomes, and may necessitate new institutions (e.g., for property rights) as traditional/informal 
mechanisms are no longer able to cope with increasing land scarcity and new economic 
structures.  Potentially, such transformations could also stretch traditional modes of community-
level conflict resolution, either because these institutions are not geared to dealing with new 
situations, or because of growing tensions between formal and informal institutions.  While 
formal land tenure may not necessarily denote security of tenure (World Bank 2003b), the 
absence of formal property rights for private agricultural land may make this a trigger for violent 
conflict, especially as land grows more scarce.  Similarly, property rights over natural resource 
rents deriving from forests and mining are often ill-defined, and subject to high contestation, 
again precipitating conflict (or conflict escalation). 9 
The existence of various ethnic, religious, and/or linguistic groups could enhance the 
likelihood of conflict.  The presence of multiple ethnic groups has often been associated with 
lower growth (Easterly and Levine 1997) and a higher probability of conflict or even civil war.  
Social sanctions against shirking may also be more difficult across ethnic groups, hence 
weakening cooperative outcomes (Miguel and Gugerty 2002).  Different groups may operate 
under different rule frameworks that allow for the peaceful resolution of conflict; when these 
competing rule systems come into contact, conflict escalation can be the result (Barron, et al. 
2004b).  Collier (2001) suggests that the impact of group diversity depends on the type of 
diversity; for example a certain degree of dominance on the part of an ethnic group could see it 
exploit a minority rather than stimulate “encompassing” policies that benefit all groups in a 
jurisdiction.  Similar mechanisms could also be associated with conflict at the local level.  At the 
international level, he finds some weak evidence of the impact of a particular range of 
dominance (namely a single group with 45-60 percent of the population share) on growth 
outcomes.  Local conflict in Indonesia is often triggered across jurisdictions.  Consequently 
measures of group “clustering” (or to use a more normative term, segregation) may be associated 
with conflict. 
Stewart (2000) has argued that horizontal inequalities – differences between groups in 
political opportunities, economic assets, employment and incomes, and social access and 
situations – play an important role in determining when and where violent conflict will take 
place.  
Ashutosh Varshney’s (2002) work on India has argued that fragmented social 
infrastructures, where participation in associational structures and informal networks 
consolidates identities and interests along, rather than across, religious and ethnic lines, explains 10 
variation in violence and peace in otherwise similar areas.  He argues that especially in urban 
areas, day-to-day interactions are insufficient to provide a bridge across ethnic/religious groups 
that stops conflicts from escalating into communal violence.  Communal violence therefore 
proves less likely in cities where associations can act as bridges across groups. 
Local institutions and leadership could provide the mechanisms for reducing or mediating 
conflict in line with Varshney’s hypothesis.  On the other hand, these same institutions may also 
be instrumental in mobilizing individuals to engage in conflict, increasing the capability for 
collective action to defend group interests.  In the analysis we distinguish between political 
institutions, religious institutions, and informal religious and adat (traditional customs) groups. 
The introduction of the democratic village council (BPD) is a centrally mandated institutional 
change aimed at increasing accountability of village leaders.  Eighty percent of the villages had 
instituted a BPD by the time of the PODES fielding.  The absence of a BPD may reflect delays in 
the implementation of this regulation, and/or entrenched opposition by local elites to these 
democratization measures or even pre-existing conflict.  Female leadership may affect the ability 
to avert violent conflict.  The presence of women in leadership positions may be indicative of a 
community’s openness to broader participation of typically excluded groups.   
The presence of different forms of group organization may ameliorate as much as 
escalate violent conflict.  Depending on context, the form of group organization – and associated 
measures to distinguish among these – as much as the levels of group diversity may require 
further investigation.  More formal religious institutions that organize a larger number of people 
may have a greater capacity and longer run interest in avoiding violent conflict than informal 
groups.  In contrast, informal organizations that are neither mandated by the state nor part of 
formal religious organization may be more successful in solving community problems 11 
(Wetterberg 2002).   At the same time, customary adat (customary law) institutions might be 
indicative of an increased adherence to traditional laws and customs.  As such, they may also 
clash with centrally mandated conflict resolution mechanisms, providing the potential for 
conflict escalation. 
Inadequate policing, ineffective courts and judicial system that allow for high levels of 
crime tend to also create space for violent conflicts to take place; incidents of crime, when 
severe, may also constitute conflicts in themselves.
 4  Public and communal security 
arrangements may therefore reduce the likelihood of conflict.  However, their existence may also 
be in response to a worsening security situation. 
3.  Empirical Evidence on Local Conflict 
The Government of Indonesia’s Village Potential Statistics survey (PODES) offers 
perhaps the first opportunity to look at the incidence and causes of conflict across Indonesia on a 
nationwide scale.  This section summarizes conflict incidence based on the data from PODES, 
and examines reporting issues.  Our comparison to a detailed qualitative study of local conflict 
(Barron, et al. 2004b) suggests that  key-respondent (i.e., village heads) based approaches like 
the PODES are subject to reporting problems.  Treated as a complement to more in-depth 
studies, however, they provide an opportunity to map levels of conflict and to test some of the 
                                                 
4 Qualitative fieldwork in over two dozen villages (see Section 3) provided some insight into the linkages between 
conflict and crime, as well as the underreporting of crime.  In three districts studied, the Bank study followed 
conflicts which involved rape as a trigger.  In these cases, rapes were public knowledge; indeed, it was the fact that 
the act had been brought to public attention – rare, given the norm of treating such matters as a family concern, and 
keeping it within the household as a result – that had led to the triggering of a broader social conflict.  Likewise, 
whereas none of the thirteen villages in East Java reported having experienced arson in the previous year, conflicts 
in a number of these villages had resulted in the burning of property (privately- and publicly-owned). 12 
competing claims about the factors associated with high levels of conflict.
5  Other intermediate 
approaches to surveys or local fieldwork for the systematic mapping of violence and conflict 
include the use of national and, increasingly, local media sources (Tadjoeddin 2002; Welsh 
2003).
6 
3.1.  The PODES Data 
The Central Bureau of Statistics’ (BPS) Village Potential series (PODES) is a long-
standing tradition of collecting data at the lowest administrative tier of local government.  It 
collects detailed information on a range of characteristics – ranging from infrastructure to village 
finance – for Indonesia’s current 69,000 villages and neighborhoods.
7  The latest PODES was 
surveyed at the end of 2002 as part of the 2003 Agricultural Census. 
                                                 
5 Other sources of information on conflict include the police, health care providers, morgues, and the Indonesian 
army (TNI).  However, it is very difficult to use these data sources for cross-provincial comparisons, in part because 
of large gaps in the data but also because common definitions (for example of violence types) are not used in 
different areas. 
6 In the absence of any primary data, the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) 
attempted to create such a dataset by compiling newspaper reports on violent conflicts (Tadjoeddin 2002).  
However, in large part because of the use of national media, which often do not record localized conflicts, the 
resulting data massively underreports levels of conflict.  The UNSFIR dataset captured only 1,093 incidents of 
conflict over an eleven-year period (1990-2001).  In contrast, PODES documented almost 5,000 villages as 
reporting conflicts in 2002 alone.  Newspaper reports will also be subject to biases.  For example, newspapers may 
only report high profile violent conflict.  At the same time, coverage may differ significantly across regions.  Areas 
with high readership or local correspondent penetration may also yield regional over-reporting biases.  The PODES 
for example suggests that local newspapers are only available in 55.9 percent of villages.  While readership may not 
be a proxy of correspondent coverage, clearly urban areas may be subject to more intense scrutiny.  However, in 
large part because of the use of national media, which often do not record localized conflicts, the resulting data 
massively underreports levels of conflict.  While further work is being conducted by UNSFIR, UNDP, the World 
Bank and independent researchers using local media sources, which appear to more accurately report conflict, the 
creation of a national dataset by such means is still a long way away. 
7 The module was apparently initiated by the BPS Directorate of National Resilience (Ketahanan) under Drs. 
Suharno.  The PODES is typically conducted in conjunction with the Population Census (e.g., 1990 and 2000), the 
Economic Census (1986 and 1996), and the Agricultural Census (1993 and 2003) (Kaiser and Molyneaux 2000). 13 
The 2003 PODES for the first time included a section on politics, conflict and crime (see 
Annex 2).  Sub-district level statistical agents (mantri statistik), who work for BPS, implement 
the survey.  Information is typically derived from the kepala desa (village heads) and lurah 
(neighborhood heads) about the occurrence of conflict in the previous year.  If conflict was 
reported, the survey asked for the type of conflict, whether it was longstanding, and the impacts 
of the conflict (fatalities, injuries, and material damage).  Finally, the survey also asked if the 
conflict was resolved, and if so, by whom (citizens, village apparatus, or security apparatus). 
Levels and Types of Conflict 
Just over 7 percent of villages and neighborhoods reported local conflict during the 
previous year (a total of 4,872 incidents) (Table 2).  The incidence of local conflict is higher in 
urban areas (8.8 versus 6.7 percent).  The relative incidence of conflicts appears to be somewhat 
higher off-Java than on Java.  However, this difference is largely explained by the high incidence 
of conflict in Aceh (23.4 percent of jurisdictions).  Omitting Aceh, the reported rates of conflict 
incidence for Java and off-Java are more similar (5.4 versus 5.7 percent).  Figure 1 reports 
conflict incidence at the district (kabupaten and kota) level, mapping the share of communities in 
each district reporting conflict.  The map highlights that conflict incidence is spread throughout 
the archipelago. 
Almost a quarter of reported conflicts were alleged to have involved fatalities, about half 
injuries, and about a third material damage.  Total fatalities arising from conflict were reported to 
be 4,869.  Reported injuries amounted to 9,823 injuries and material damages of 771 billion 
rupiah (est. 91.4 million USD). 
The majority of conflicts on Java (72 percent) were reported to be new.  At first blush, 
less than half of all conflicts off-Java (3.9 versus 8.0 percent incidence) were new.  However, the 14 
rate is almost identical to that on Java if Aceh is excluded, reflecting the continuous nature of 
reported conflict in that province. 
 
 
Table 2: Local Conflict 











National  7.1 4.4  3.9  68,815 
Rural  6.7 4.2  3.6  56,748 
Urban  8.8 5.8  5.7  12,067 
Java  5.4 3.6  4.0  24,962 
Off-Java  8.0 4.9  3.9  43,853 
Off-Java (ex. Aceh)  5.7 3.5  4.1  38,118 
Source: PODES 2003 (Questions 17.03) 
The highest rates of villages and neighborhoods reporting conflict by province were in 
Aceh (23.4 percent), Maluku (15.7 percent), and NTB (13.8 percent) (see Table 3).  The lowest 
incidence of conflict was reported in South Kalimantan (1.4 percent), South Sumatra (2.3 
percent), and Bengkulu (2.4 percent) (see Table 3). 
Table 4: Type of Local Conflict 

















Civil/Group Strife  52.1 64.6  48.5  76.2  42.9  67.1  3.6 
Strife w/ Gov Apparatus  7.0 66.5  7.6 3.6  8.4  5.4  13.2 
School Strife  2.7 45.9  1.8 3.9  2.2  2.8  1.2 
Ethnic Strife  3.3 51.8  3.2 1.0  4.2  6.5  0.5 
Other  34.9 58.4  38.9  15.3  42.4  18.2  81.4 
(N)  4,958 61.7  3,875  1,376 3,582  2,213  1,369 
Source: PODES 2003 (Questions 17.04a) 
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Table 4 lists the reported type of conflict.  Just over half of conflicts were categorized as 
civil strife.  The ratio was almost three-quarters on Java.  Ethnic strife accounted for only 3.3 
percent of reported conflict incidents.  Ethnic conflict was more important off-Java.  Omitting 
Aceh, ethnic conflict accounted for 6.5 percent of conflict incidents off-Java (but only 1 percent 
on Java).  Within conflict types, the majority of instances were reported as violent, except in the 
case of school strife (student clashes). 
The resolution of conflict 
Almost three-quarters (72 percent) of conflicts were reported to have been resolved.  The 
security apparatus was most frequently mentioned as the agency that ended the conflict (45.7 
percent).  This ratio tended to be higher on Java. 
Table 5: Agency in Conflict Resolution 













Population  21.0  23.0  13.1 25.5 15.0 74.9 
Village Apparatus  33.2  34.6  34.7 32.4 37.4 9.0 
Security Apparatus  45.7  42.4  52.2 42.1 47.7 16.0 
(N)  3,544  2,605  1,269 2,275 1,876  399 
Source: PODES 2003 (Questions 17.04e) 
 
Village institutions were attributed with ending conflict in a third of the cases, and were 
relatively more important off-Java.  Aceh stands in marked contrast to all other provinces.  Not 
only were the vast majority of conflicts classified as “other”, but the comparative rates at which 
village or security apparatuses were credited with resolving conflicts was only about one-third 
(compared with more than three-quarters in the rest of the archipelago). 16 
3.2.  Field Verification of PODES Conflict Reporting 
As part of a study on conflict and community-driven development being undertaken by 
the World Bank (Barron, et al. 2004a), a team of researchers conducted an intensive mapping 
and evaluation exercise in four districts (kabupaten) in East Java and NTT.  The provinces were 
chosen to be different using both formal (PODES, SUSENAS) and informal (interviewing at the 
national and provincial levels) sources.  Two districts were then purposively selected within each 
province as having either a high capacity to manage conflict (Ponorogo in East Java; Sikka in 
NTT) or a low capacity (Pamekasan in East Java; Manggarai in NTT).  Within each district two 
‘matching’ sub-districts (kecamatan) were picked based on program evaluation considerations.
8  
After a conflict mapping exercise at the district and sub-district levels, 25 ‘case’ villages 
were chosen purposively within the selected sub-districts on the basis of a number of criteria 
aimed at targeting the most interesting conflicts to track.  Findings from this work provide some 
valuable insights into the reporting of conflict incidence from PODES, in particular definitions, 
categorizations, and incentives for reporting on the part of key respondents such as village heads.  
The qualitative fieldwork obtained detailed information on 25 and the conflicts within each.  We 
cross-checked the groups of questions from PODES that considered conflict, its impacts and the 
way it is resolved (PODES questions 1703 – 1704). 
                                                 
8 The KDP & Community Conflict Negotiation study is a large-scale mixed methods study of local level conflict 
and conflict resolution in Indonesia which aims to ascertain – systematically and empirically – the factors that affect 
local level conflict management capacity and that contribute to varying levels of violent conflict (Barron, et al. 
2004a).  In addition to identifying the factors that impact on local capacity to manage conflict, the research also 
examines the extent to which the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP), the Bank’s primary community 
development program in Indonesia, impacts on communities’ conflict management ability.  Because the research is 
evaluating program impact, in each district a treatment (KDP) sub-district and control (non-KDP) sub-district were 
selected.  These sub-districts were matched, using propensity scoring techniques and qualitative verification. 17 
3.3.  Levels and Impacts of Conflict 
Comparing the two data sources hints at significant underreporting of conflict in PODES 
(see Table 6).  Of the 25 villages, PODES reported only four as having experienced conflict in 
the previous year: one out of 13 in East Java (7.7%), and three out of 12 in NTT (25%).  While 
we would not have expected all of the villages to have registered as having conflict in the 
PODES – because not all of the conflicts we tracked took place in the year 2002 – this does 
suggest that PODES is not capturing all conflicts. 



















#  (%) selected 
desa 
with Conflict 
(based on Field 
Assessment) 
East Java (3.5%) 
Ponorogo (1.7%)  303 (21)  6 (2)  1 (16.7%)  6 (100%) 
Pamekasan (3.2%)  189 (13)  7 (2)  0 (0%)  6 (85.7%) 
NTT (11.6%) 
Sikka (14.3%)  140 (8)  6 (2)  2 (33.3%)  3 (50%) 
Manggarai (12.0%)  375 (16)  6 (2)  1 (16.7%)  6 (100%) 
Sources:  PODES 2003 and KDP & Community Conflict Negotiation Study 
 
The case of Pamekasan, a district on the island on Madura, just off the Javanese coast 
near Surabaya, provides a stark example.  None of the seven villages studied in Madura were 
reported in PODES as having experienced conflict in the past year.  Yet, in six of the seven 
villages, the World Bank researchers tracked conflicts that had taken place in 2002,
9 including 
mass sickle battles between communities and the burning of alleged dukun santet (witch 
doctors).  Similarly, in Ponorogo, close to Central Java, PODES reported only one village as 
                                                 
9 In the other village, the conflict followed had taken place previous to 2002 and the researchers determined that no 
significant conflict had taken place in 2002. 18 
having experienced conflict in the past year; researchers followed conflicts that had taken place 
in 2002 in all six villages chosen from that district.  Conflicts here included battles between rival 
silat (martial arts) groups, clashes over village head elections, and a dispute between a 
community and a state-run mining enterprise. 
There appeared to be a similar trend of underreporting in the NTT districts.  In 
Manggarai, the westernmost district on the island of Flores, only one of six villages reported 
conflict; yet, according to the research teams on the ground, all six had experienced significant 
unrest in the previous calendar year.  Whereas  PODES did pick up conflict over land between 
groups in Tanah Rata village, it missed a range of other land conflicts across the district.  In 
Sikka, the figures from PODES and the field research were closer: PODES reported two villages 
as having experienced conflict; the qualitative assessment determined that three villages had 
been the location for conflict in the previous year. 
The impacts of conflict were also underreported in the PODES.  Across the 25 villages, 
PODES reported three injuries and no deaths as resulting from conflict.  Analysis of the 
qualitative primary data from the research sites, as well as secondary sources including figures 
from the police, health care providers and newspaper sources, would indicate that the human 
costs of violent conflict in the villages studied were in fact much higher.  Likewise, a large 
percentage of the cases followed in the qualitative research involved property (private, company 
or state-owned) being burnt down; these financial costs were, by and large, not picked up by 
PODES. 
3.4.  Insights from Comparison of PODES and Qualitative Data Sources 
The comparison of the broad PODES data with that gathered in the more in-depth 
qualitative work hints at some of the weaknesses in the PODES dataset.  There appears to be a 19 
significant underreporting of conflict.  PODES did not pick up many of the conflicts observed in 
the villages where the in-depth research was conducted.  
It should not be surprising that in-depth qualitative evaluations would yield more 
instances of local conflict.  A better understanding of why conflict is underreported provides 
some insights for improvements for future survey design (e.g., in the context of the 2005 
PODES), but also whether under-reporting is systemic or whether it varies across area.  If errors 
in reporting levels are correlated systematically with particular features of these localities, this 
introduces bias in a regression framework. 
There are at least two reasons why conflict might be under-reported in PODES.  The first 
concerns cognition: how respondents understand the questions asked.  The PODES instrument 
asks whether a village has experienced conflict in the past year, but it does not say what is meant 
by conflict.  Does conflict only include large-scale incidents with large numbers of deaths or 
material destruction?  Is violent crime a kind of conflict?  In many places village head elections 
result in the polarization of villages into two hostile groups.  If violence appears to be latent, but 
has not yet erupted, should this be counted as being an example of conflict?   
Preliminary evidence from PODES suggests that village heads tend to define conflict 
narrowly, only reporting conflict as having occurred if it was violent and had significant human 
or physical impacts.  In 62.7% of villages reporting conflict, respondents explicitly identified 
deaths, injuries or material damage. 
A second explanation for the lower levels of conflicts in PODES is functional and relates 
to the incentives, or lack thereof, for village heads to give an accurate and honest response to 
questions about conflict in their village.  In the absence of clear knowledge about the purposes of 
the survey – and how the resulting data will be used – village heads may understate problems in 20 
their village.
10   Experience from qualitative fieldwork would suggest that this problem is a real 
one.  In many cases, authority figures would fail to mention significant conflicts that were only 
later discovered after the number and type of informants was increased.  Further, lack of 
disclosure may have a moral as well as rational basis.  Conflict, in Indonesia as elsewhere, is 
often seen as a sign of failure, with harmony in village life particularly valued.
11  As such, it is 
not surprising that many village heads might be economical with the truth when describing 
unrest in their villages.
12 
What are the implications for how we interpret PODES and to what extent does it limit 
the dataset’s utility in mapping conflict and assessing its causes?  The first clear implication is 
that levels of conflict may in fact be significantly higher than the PODES data would suggest.  
This conclusion is backed up by other case study research – using qualitative and secondary data 
                                                 
10 Under the New Order, the village head was appointed by, and accountable to, the district government.  While this 
fundamentally changed under the regional autonomy law (Law 22/1999), with village heads elected and accountable 
to the elected village council (BPD), in reality changes have been slow coming, with the new system only recently 
implemented in some districts, and still awaited in others (Antlov 2001).  
11 Many anthropologists of Indonesian life stress the value local communities place upon harmony and social 
cohesion.  See, for example, Tule (2000) who emphasises the importance in Flores of the ‘house’ as a provider of 
harmony: “for the Keo of Flores and other tribes in NTT [the house] is a cultural force which plays a centripetal role 
in uniting and incorporating its members into a social unit … [a] system has been built up which supports the 
harmonious relationship among house members, both Christians and Muslims.”  While the extent to which such 
harmony actually exists in Flores, or elsewhere in Indonesia, is a subject for hot debate, the degree to which the 
discourse frames discussion of social relations in many villages is incontestable. 
12 Comparing the PODES data with the results of the qualitative research reveals that there is less of a difference 
between the two data sources on less sensitive issues.  For example, the data on the characteristics of village 
leadership broadly matched that derived from the qualitative fieldwork.  Aside from some discrepancies in the age 
and education of the village head (they tended to report themselves as younger and more educated than they actually 
were!) the two data sources generally verified each other.  21 
– that would indicate that in at least some parts of Indonesia, levels of violent conflict are higher 
than those reported in PODES.
13   
While the figures do not report all conflicts in Indonesia, as long as this underreporting is 
systemic (that is, fairly equal across regions or characteristics of regions) the data still provide 
information about relative levels of conflict across regions (e.g., which provinces have higher 
levels of conflict) thus allowing for consideration of potential factors associated with conflict.  If 
the same questions were asked again in the next PODES (2005/6) it would also tell us whether 
conflict levels were increasing or decreasing, both nationally and for a given area. 
The comparison with qualitative work to-date suggests that while PODES may not 
accurately represent true levels of conflict across Indonesia, there is little evidence to suggest 
that the data are biased by particular characteristics of different localities.  Under-reporting in 
East Java and NTT research sites were of similar magnitudes across areas with different majority 
religions, at different stages of development, and with different levels of conflict.  Consistent 
ratios of conflict relative to conflict with explicit casualties and material damage also suggest at 
least some common understanding of conflict across cultures.   The five provinces with a ratio of 
reported conflict to explicitly violent conflict (involving deaths/injuries/material damage) of 50 
percent or less were spread across three very different islands (Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Java).  
A focus of future quantitative work will have to be improved survey design and respondent 
selection methods to elicit actual levels of bias, as well as to control for different cultural 
understandings of what defines particular conflict thresholds. 
                                                 
13 For example, Welsh’s (2003) study of vigilante killings in West Java and Barron and Madden’s (2003) study of 
Lampung would suggest levels of conflict higher than the respective PODES provincial rates of 7.9% and 3.5%. 22 
4. Empirical  Results 
This section tests which regionally specific factors correlate with conflict as it is reported 
in the 2003 PODES data.  We use the analytical framework as a basis for the selection of 
variables to be included in the model.  The estimated coefficients should be viewed as measures 
of association, rather than causation.  Almost any variable could be considered endogenous in the 
model as conflict affects almost all aspects of civic, political and economic life.  In addition, 
respondent bias could cause apparent correlations between variables reporting conflict and right 
hand side variables drawn from the same data source.   
We derived proxies for local poverty, inequality, diversity, economic shocks, land tenure, 
and community political, associational, and security arrangements from the PODES, 2000 
Population Census and the 2000 SUSENAS household survey (see Table 7).  In the case of the 
PODES, we were able to utilize these variables at the local level.  We matched variables from 
the Population Census as the sub-district level.  SUSENAS data on household consumption-
related indicators were available at the district level. 
A logit model is applied and estimated at the village level.  Table 8 reports estimated 
coefficients of the models with the variable indicating whether the community experienced 
conflict in the past year the dependent variable.
14  In our estimates we distinguish between rural 
and urban areas, based on the assumption that conflict dynamics may be structurally different 
                                                 
14 The model controls for the fact that observations might not necessarily be independent within sub-districts.  Our 
variable was define as one whether or not the community reported casualties or material damage.  The results for the 
narrower definition of conflict were very similar. 23 
between the two.
15  We present estimates including and excluding provincial dummies, and with 
or without Aceh.  A range of factors, including propensity to report, may vary at the provincial 
level. 
Hypothesis: Poverty is associated with increased conflict.  Our estimates focused on 
both absolute consumption poverty levels at the district level (from the SUSENAS), how poor a 
locality was relative to its respective district (PODES), and recent trends in locality poverty.
16  
District poverty levels appeared to increase the likelihood of conflict (Table 8, (3) & (4)), 
although this was no longer the case when provincial dummies were added for the provinces 
(Eq., 1-2) or when we added Aceh to the sample.  This suggests the province specific dynamics 
of district poverty incidence may matter.  In one of our qualitative case study provinces, East 
Java, poorer districts actually seemed to be associated with less conflict (Eq. 7).  Although 
relative poverty did not appear to be significantly associated with conflict, changes in poverty 
were significant in rural areas. 
Hypothesis: Inequality is associated with increased conflict.  Although the SUSENAS 
allows us to calculate a measure of household consumption inequality, the indicator is only 
                                                 
15 The qualitative work in the previous section focused on rural areas (desa) in East Java and NTT.  In contrast, for 
example, the work of Varshney on communal conflict in India focuses on cities. 
16 We created the Poverty Gap index of poverty (Foster Greer Thorbecke) using per capita consumption as a welfare 
measure.  The poverty gap is based on the average distance that the poor’s consumption falls below the poverty line.  
We defined village-based poverty from the PODES, based on the Indonesian family planning board’s (BKKBN) 
census of poor households.  The indicators are whether a household has an earth floor, whether household members 
have separate clothing for work and leisure, whether they are able to perform their religious duties, and if 
households are able to seek medical care when needed.   Relative poverty is defined as  j ij
rel
ij p p p / =
 where  ij p
 
the fraction of poor households in village i  in region j.  j p
  is the mean poverty rate in all villages in district j.  Our 
relative measure was based on a question which asked whether there had been a recent increase in these “poverty 
letters.” 24 
available at the district level.  This district level indicator may reflect urban-rural disparities in a 
district, rather than individual disparities.  We therefore constructed an indicator based on 
educational attainment disparities from the Census, for males aged 20-30.  The measure 
encompasses not only differences in access to education for a comparable age group, but also is 
indicative of income inequality as earnings are highly correlated with education.  We find that in 
rural areas, higher inequality in this measure is associated with higher conflict, a result we also 
find when applying the provincial dummies. 
Hypothesis: Unemployment and current lack of economic opportunity is associated 
with increased conflict.  Localities with higher unemployment shares (based on the PODES) 
were associated with higher conflict.  This finding is not surprising, as especially among young 
men it can be a factor underlying conflict situations (Barron and Madden 2003). 
Logit coefficient variables are difficult to interpret directly.  Unlike standard OLS 
estimates, the marginal impact of a variable cannot be directly read off the coefficient, but 
depends on the relative value of all other values (Long and Freese 2003).  Unemployment was 
reported as 4 percent in the average locality.  Although this measure certainly masks a high 
degree of underemployment, it serves as a general measure of economic conditions or shocks in 
a village.  The estimate of the marginal effect indicates that a 10 percent point increase in 
unemployment is associated with a 0.6 percent point (or 10 percent based on an average probably 
of 6-7 percent) increase in the likelihood of conflict.  
Hypothesis:  Shocks increase the likelihood of conflict.  A recent natural disaster in a 
locality was positively associated with conflict across the range of specifications.  A natural 
disaster in the community increases the likelihood of conflict by 1.7 percent point (evaluated for 
all other variables at their mean in equation 1).  The probability of conflict in rural areas 25 
(excluding Aceh) is 6 percent.  This suggests that a natural disaster increases the likelihood of 
conflict by 29 percent.  
Hypothesis: Insecure income sources are associated with increased conflict.  Changes 
in the structure of the economy create insecurity over future income streams.  When agriculture 
does not provide sufficient income, households need to move to other sectors, or outside of the 
village.  Inward migration increases the competition for sources of income, and may in this way 
increase conflict.  For instance, tensions heightened in districts in Madura after the inflow of 
internally displaced people (IDPs) from Kalimantan.  We hypothesize that this insecurity in 
income sources leads to higher levels of social tensions, and thus higher levels of conflict. 
The share of individuals working outside of agriculture did not show any association with 
conflict in either rural or urban areas.  The presence of inward or outward migration was 
positively associated with conflict in rural areas, although we did not find a similar effect in 
urban areas.  In urban areas, almost every community reported in- and outward migration (90 
and 98 percent respectively), and even in rural areas these figures were high (67 and 96 percent 
respectively).  Ideally future work will yield measures of the intensity of migration impacts, and 
the conditions under which these seem to be associated with higher incidences of conflict.   
We constructed a measure of structural change based on the share of agricultural land that 
was converted to other purposes in the past year (estimated to be about 3 and 2 percent 
respectively in the average urban neighborhoods or rural villages).  This indicates that land 
conversions were positively associated with conflict in rural areas.  The result also showed up 
significantly in NTT. 
Hypothesis: Insecurity of property rights is associated with increased conflict.  The 
PODES defines three categories for agricultural land: privately-used land with title, privately-26 
used land without title, and communally-used land (including that for village heads).
17  We 
examined whether lack of titling in private land was associated with heightened conflict, and 
found very mixed results.  In most specifications the results were insignificant.  In urban areas in 
the absence of provincial dummies the variable was actually associated with lower conflict.  
Rural results for NTT seemed to be more in line with expectations, but were not significant at the 
5 percent level.  The results underscore that formal title does not necessarily denote security of 
tenure, the absence of which could fuel conflict (World Bank 2003b). 
We also constructed indicators from the PODES that are set to one if mining or forestry 
are the mains sources of household income.  For both of these sectors, property rights are ill 
defined.  We did not find any significant effects of these variables on conflict, except in the case 
of East Java, where villages that depended primarily on mining were associated with higher 
levels of conflict. 
Hypothesis: Group diversity is associated with increased conflict.  The 2000 Population 
Census collects self-reported ethnic status, a first for Indonesian household questionnaires since 
before the start of the New Order.  Over 1000 different ethnic groups were reported.  We use the 
responses to these answers to construct a sub-district level indicator of ethnic diversity.  We were 
unable to develop village level measures because of the difficulty of matching the Census and 
the PODES at the village level.  The PODES provided a limited number of diversity measures at 
the local level, including the presence of multiple ethnic groups, whether there were different 
                                                 
17 Since only three quarters of villages provided a detailed decomposition of land use, we introduced a dummy to 
denote reporting and set the remaining values of this variable to zero. 27 
main religions across localities within a sub-district, and whether there were marriages across 
ethnic groups in a village. 
We constructed various regional measures of ethnic and religious fractionalization, as 
well as clustering/segregation within regions (see Annex 1).  Fractionalization refers to the 
probability that individuals within a region are from a different group, whereas clustering 
suggests that this diversity is concentrated in certain areas within a region.
18  Problems can easily 
be framed in an ‘us versus them’ way if villages are dominated by one ethnic group.
19  Collier 
(2001) suggests that dominance – rather than high diversity or homogeneity – on the part of one 
group (e.g., 45 to 90 percent) may be associated with conflict, for example as this group raises 
grievances in order to attempt to monopolize local resources.  Finally, we also generated 
measures of horizontal group inequality (Stewart 2002), to capture whether different groups have 
very different educational endowments.
20   
There was some evidence that diversity was associated with higher conflict, although the 
results are very tentative.  The presence of more than one religion in a sub-district increased the 
likelihood of conflict in a sub-district in both urban and rural areas, although this result washes 
out with the addition of provincial dummies.  Our Theil measure of ethnic diversity did not yield 
significant results, except in NTT where it was associated with higher conflict.  Our village level 
measure of ethnic diversity did not yield significant associations.  Clustering of ethnic groups 
                                                 
18 In contrast to fractionalization, polarization occurs when there are two groups of equal size (Alesina, et al. 2003). 
19 The reverse causality is also plausible.  If conflict between ethnic groups arises, individuals within groups may 
migrate and look for protection by living close to others from the same group. 
20 Our definition calculates the ratio of the highest average household head education within a group to the lowest in 
a district.  To avoid small group effects, we dropped all groups that were reported to be less than five percent of the 
population share in a district. 28 
across villages was associated with higher levels of conflict in rural areas.  There was some 
evidence that lack of dominance or high fragmentation, defined as no single group having more 
that 40 percent of a sub-district’s education share, was associated with higher conflict.  The 
presence of inter-ethnic marriages in rural areas was associated with higher conflict.  Counter to 
prediction, our measure of horizontal inequality (see Annex 1) seemed to be associated with 
lower levels of conflict in rural areas.  Further research is needed to scrutinize, and help us 
understand, this result.  More effort needs to be devoted to constructing indicators of horizontal 
inequality at lower levels of geographic disaggregation.  Our measure, which focuses on the best 
versus the least endowed group, could be contrasted with one that focuses on more intermediate 
ranges.  Further work could focus on which group differences matter in fueling conflict, with a 
subsequent definition of appropriate indicators and data needs. 
Hypothesis: Increased local participation or encompassing organization is associated 
with lower levels of conflict.  Our indicators of political/associational organization must be 
treated with extreme caution, as these are not only some of the most difficult to measure, but also 
suffer significantly from endogeneity bias.  For example, evidence of increased community 
association may act to reduce conflict (e.g., especially if as argued by Varshney these institutions 
are able to build bridges across communities).  However, particular forms of group association 
may also lower the costs to mobilization, enhancing the likelihood of conflict.  At the same time, 
associations may mobilize ex-post in response to a conflict, either to provide succor to re-
establish community relations, or to perpetuate conflict.  In sum, evidence of the role of local 
social capital defined broadly has been extremely difficult to establish in a compelling manner 
(Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004).  Our proxies of formal or informal institutional factors should 
therefore not be interpreted to denote causality, but to spur better measurement (and empirical 29 
frameworks) for evaluations related to local conflict building on a mixed qualitative-quantitative 
approach.    
The PODES survey collects information on village/neighborhood institutions.  We have 
constructed variables which indicate the presence of religious groups, adat (traditional 
law/customs) institutions, and the number of places for worship.  We also used variables that 
indicate whether there is a BPD in the village and the gender of the village head.  The BPD is a 
mandated democratically elected council in rural areas. 
Religious groups and adat institutions are associated with higher levels of conflict.  One 
possible explanation may be that their presence reflects differences in norms about conflict 
resolution.  The qualitative work indicated that often varying expectations between different 
groups in the community, or between the community and the state, about how tensions should be 
resolved resulted in conflict.  The density of places of worship on the other hand is associated 
with lower levels of conflict, especially in rural areas.  This may support Varshneys’ hypothesis 
that institutions that can resolve tensions that exist between their constituencies play an 
important role in preventing conflict from arising and escalating.  The absence of a BPD in a 
rural village has no effect on conflict in the regression with provincial dummies, but does appear 
to be associated with lower levels of conflict in the regression that does not include these 
controls.  The presence of a female village leader is associated with lower level of conflict in 
rural areas.  This however, is still a rare phenomena: only 2 percent of the rural communities had 
a female village leader. 
Hypothesis: Better public or communal provision of security is associated with lower 
conflict.  The PODES allows us to construct variables concerning the presence of formal and 
informal security in a village, including whether the community has organized its own security 30 
(volunteers for poskambling (security posts), checkpoints to see who is entering the village), and 
the distance to the nearest police post.  We find some evidence in rural areas that the presence of 
communal security arrangements is associated with a reduced likelihood of conflict.  In contrast, 
distance to a police station reduces the likelihood of conflict.
21  These associations must be 
interpreted with extreme caution, as this may actually reflect good targeting (posts are built 
nearer to likely trouble spots) or simply reflect that more isolated villages are less prone to 
conflict.  These associations should provide an impetus to further on-going qualitative work to 
evaluate potential dynamics behind these associations, and subsequent means to better test these 
quantitatively. 
5. Conclusions 
The paper has presented the results of a unique large-scale effort in a developing country 
to monitor the incidence of local conflict, Indonesia’s 2003 PODES.  We found that conflict is 
significant across Indonesia, rather than being highly concentrated in just a few areas.  This has 
significant implications for how we understand the roots of conflict in Indonesia.  It suggests the 
need to investigate systemic factors associated with conflict, in addition to understanding often 
highly localized dynamics through qualitative approaches.  From a policy perspective, the 
potential for conflict must be taken into account when designing development interventions for 
areas across Indonesia.  From a research perspective, it implies the consideration and exploration 
of conflicts in areas beyond those normally thought of as being ‘high conflict’. 
                                                 
21 We also tested this with another variable that asked whether a police post was difficult to reach with similar 
results. 31 
The paper, in comparing the quantitative data with that gathered from a large-scale 
ethnographic World Bank study on conflict, has also hinted at some of the weaknesses of the 
PODES data.  In particular, the comparison would suggest that PODES significantly under-
reports levels of conflict (both violent and not), and that this is true across the archipelago.  The 
paper sets out two reasons for this: unclear definitions of conflict, and lack of incentives for 
respondents to be honest about conflict levels.  We argued that the key question with regard to 
the usefulness of the data is whether under-reporting is biased (i.e. levels of under-reporting 
differ across locations) or whether it is systemic, with levels of underreporting similar across 
sites.  We suggested that the latter is more likely to be the case, but that more research (perhaps 
by comparing different data sources on more areas) would need to be conducted to reach firm 
conclusions. 
We conducted a quantitative analysis to find out which locally-specific factors are 
correlated with the presence of conflict.  We found that poverty by itself has very little 
correlation with conflict.  Changes in economic conditions, on the other hand do.  
Unemployment is universally closely associated with higher conflict rates; high in- and outward 
migration for work/school have similar positive associations with conflict.  Our land variables 
indicate that the share of converted land in rural areas is associated with higher levels of conflict; 
the fraction of titled land has no correlation with conflict.  The presence of a natural disaster is 
also clearly associated with higher conflict. 
Much of the headline conflict in Indonesia is reported as clashes between ethnic groups.  
Only a small proportion (3.3%) of conflict reported in PODES was described as being ‘ethnic’.  
The 2000 Census for the first time collected self-reported ethnicity and we used this data to 
investigate the correlation between conflict and ethnicity.  We find no evidence that increased 32 
ethnic diversity affects conflict.  We do find that in areas where there is no single ethnic group 
dominant, conflict is more likely to be present.  As expected, higher clustering of ethnic groups 
within villages across a sub-district is associated with higher levels of conflict.  The main counter 
intuitive finding is that higher horizontal inequality, measured as the difference between the 
educational attainments of large ethnic groups, is associated with lower levels of conflict.  
Further research is needed to investigate the dynamic behind this correlation.  
Institutions matter for mediating potential conflict.  We investigated the correlation 
between the presence of institutions and conflict, but at the same time recognized that their very 
presence may result from conflict.  We find that the density of places of worship is associated 
with lower levels of conflict, while the absence of a democratically elected village council (BPD) 
is associated with a higher conflict potential.  Religious groups and traditional law institution, 
however, are associated with higher levels of conflict.  This suggests that while formal 
institutions have a role in mediating between religious groups, informal institutions may flare up 
with conflict and/or negatively affect the scope for mediation as tensions rises.  The presence of 
security posts is associated with lower levels of conflict in rural areas as is the distance from a 
police post.  
A more systematic mapping of conflict should stimulate work on assessing the impacts of 
conflict in Indonesia, not just in high-profile conflict areas but beyond.  An appreciation of the 
pervasive costs of conflict to individuals, firms, and society, and the incidence of these effects, 
will alert policy makers to the real costs of conflict.  For example, while our research suggests 
that it is not the poorest communities that experience conflict, the disproportionate costs of 
conflict may actually fall on especially poor and vulnerable households. 33 
Future work along the lines presented in this paper will need to focus on a number of 
areas, including (a) improved methodologies and instrument implementation to measure the 
incidence of local conflict, (b) better empirical proxies at the local level to measure potential 
factors associated with conflict, and (c) increased attention to empirical research design to begin 
to address issues of causality. 
With its national coverage, the BPS’s PODES initiative provides an unprecedented 
insight with regards to the incidence of local conflict beyond those areas that have tended to 
capture the headlines.  The PODES relies on village/neighborhood leadership as key 
respondents, under the assumption that these people are the most informed and able to report 
conflict at the local level.  The approach potentially provides a systematic mapping of conflict by 
administrative area, something well beyond the ability of household surveys, given sampling 
requirements.  As the paper points out, there may be certain factors that can cause underreporting 
of conflicts.  In future enumerations of the survey, the statistical agents who implement the 
survey (mantri statistik) could be encouraged to cross-check the data on conflict with other key 
respondents, while at the same time gaining a better understanding of their reporting incentives.  
Additional work might compare these results with more targeted surveys of household 
respondents in a subset of localities.
22   We would therefore certainly recommend that BPS retain 
the local conflict module in the 2005 PODES, but that it consider some refinements to the 
                                                 
22 At the time of writing, the University of Gadjah Mada in Yogya with the World Bank is implementing a 
household survey in an estimated six hundred villages that includes some refined conflict questions. 34 
module in terms of definitions/thresholds, sequencing of questions, and the training of statistical 
agents.
23 
Our paper has presented a number of potential measures for local level inequality, 
diversity, and group inequality.  Future qualitative work might gain a better understanding of 
group dynamics at the local level, and how these could be mapped in local indicators (for 
example from the Population Census), and then mapped across datasets.  Similar efforts should 
be made in devising simple but effective proxies for the effectiveness of local institutions that 
might help mediate conflict.  We have argued that quantitative work is at this stage only effective 
in identifying underlying associations with conflict.  Qualitative work can help in identifying 
pathways and directions of causality.  In a mixed quantitative-qualitative framework (Rao and 
Woolcock 2003), future refinements of the quantitative evidence and methodological 
frameworks could lead to better hypothesis testing and the derivation of potential policy findings.  
This paper is but an initial presentation of the results and implications of the 2003 PODES on 
conflict.  We hope that it will stimulate further debates and consideration, both of the causes of 
                                                 
23 First, the definitions – of conflict and its types – should be clearer in the instrument.  At present, it is unclear what 
exactly is meant by conflict.  For example rephrasing the guidance for the question about whether conflict existed in 
the village, refining its parameters, perhaps by setting a minimum threshold for incidents that should be included, 
would better ensure consistency of reporting.  For example, respondents could be asked “has there been a conflict in 
the past year in this village in which at least one person was killed or injured, or in which there was damage of 
property or goods?”  This would help ensure that there is a common understanding of conflict amongst respondents, 
and would hence limit biased under-reporting, giving us more confidence in the resulting data.  More accurate 
descriptors for conflict and crime types would also help in this respect.  Second, the ordering of questions might help 
with the incentives question.  If questions are carefully ordered, with ‘gentler’ less sensitive questions coming first, 
at least some level of trust can be built between interviewer and interviewee, perhaps resulting in more open 
responses.  Other techniques such as using enumerators who speak local languages, and explaining in more detail 
what the survey will be used for (and what it will not), can also help.  A third recommendation, which would show 
more clearly trends over time, as well as capture more of the social tensions that exist in villages, would be to ask 
the respondents not just to recall conflicts that took place in the last year, but also those that occurred in the two 
years before that. 35 
conflict in Indonesia, and of the methodological tools we can use to measure and understand 
local conflict more generally. 36 
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Annex 1: Measures of Group Diversity and Inequality 
1. Diversity  Measures 
To measure ethnic or religious diversity, we apply the Theil multi-group segregation 
















π   (1)  
where  m π is defined as the share of ethnic class m in the total population.
24  A high 
value of the index indicates more ethnic diversity.  If all the population is from one group , 
i.e.  1 = m π  for m=j and  0 = m π for  j m ≠ , the index reaches its lowest value of zero.  The 
upper bound depends on the numbers of ethnic groups. 
The Theil index is similar to the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) measure used 
in much of the international literature (Alesina, et al. 2003).  The measure equals one minus 
the sum of individual group shares.  ELF measures the probability of two individuals in an 
area coming from the same group.  The measure is effectively the inverse of a Herfindahl 
measure.  Zero entails high homogeneity, whereas a maximum of one entails that all 
individuals come from a different group.  
 
2. Ethnic  Clustering/Segregation 
While the ELF is at first sight easier to interpret, the Theil has a number of attractive 
statistical properties, including the ability to construct measures of the ethnic and religious 
segregation (or “clustering”) (Reardon and Firebaugh 2002; Reardon, et al. 2000).  A further 
advantage is that it can be decomposed to capture individual group contributions (Iceland 
2002).  The decomposed Theil index (H) compares how diverse sub-areas in a given area as a 
whole (e.g., villages relative to the sub-district).  The index ranges from 0 (little “clustering”) 







































Where  j t  is the population in sub-area (e.g., village) j, and T = the total population in 
the area (e.g., sub-district).  The ethnic segregation index is based on comparing the shares of 
an ethnicity in a sub-jurisdiction (e.g., village) ( jm π ) to its overall share in a jurisdiction 
                                                 














 so that one needs to sum only over the ethnic groups that are observed.   40 












 that  is, the share of ethnic group m in village j as a 
proportion of the share of that ethnic group in the whole population in the sub-district.  If 
jm r =1 for all j and m, all ethnic groups are evenly distributed across villages and the index 
equals zero.  Note that it is not an indication of whether one group is more dominant than the 
other.  Ethnic dominance is defined by the share in the population of the largest group 
3. Dominance 
We measure dominance based on the share of the largest self-reported group in a jurisdiction. 
( ) rm m r S π max =   (3)  
 
4. Local  Inequality 
In the absence of consumption or income measures by group and/or locality, we used 
educational attainment from the census as a measure of wealth, for males aged 20-30 in the 
kecamatan (sub-district).  The standard deviation is used as the inequality measure.  
 
5. Horizontal  Inequality 
Our measure of horizontal group inequality measures the most to least educationally 









HI = , with m denoting groups that represent at least 10 percent of the 
population 41 
Annex 2:  PODES Politics and Security Module 











Sebutkan 3 partai yang memperoleh suara terbanyak pada Pemilu yang lalu  
1. ………………….    2. ……………………  3. ……………………… 
Name the three parties which got the most votes in the last general election 




Apakah ada kantor partai politik di desa/ kelurahan ini?     
      Ada  - 1            Tidak    - 2 




Apakah pernah terjadi konflik di desa/kelurahan ini selama setahun terakhir  
      Ya        - 1             Tidak    - 2            P1705 
Has there been any conflict in the village over the past year? 
Yes                                             No 





a.  Bila "Ya", jenis konflik yang sering terjadi selama setahun terakhir 
     Perkelahian antar kelompok warga        - 1              Perkelahian pelajar            - 3  
     Perkelahian warga dengan aparat         - 2  Perkelahian antar suku  - 4 
  Keamanan Lainnya               - 5      
                   ( Tuliskan) 
If yes, type of conflict which has frequently occurred over the last year? 
Disputes between groups of villagers                        Disputes between students 
Disputes been the villagers and the apparatus          Inter-ethnic disputes 




b.  Bila "Ya", apakah  konflik yang terjadi selama setahun terakhir adalah: 
           Konflik baru        - 1      Konflik lama      - 2   
c.  Jumlah korban akibat konflik 
Meninggal      …………..… 
orang 
Luka-luka      
 …………..…  orang 
Material (Ribuan Rupiah)     
 Rp.………………     
Apakah konflik tersebut dapat diselesaikan secara damai:   
  Ya  - 1    Tidak  - 2    P1705 
e.  Bila “Ya”, diselesaikan oleh siapa  
    Masyarakat   -1  Aparat desa     - 2          Aparat keamanan   - 3 
If yes, is the conflict which occurred during the last year: 
                 New Conflict                                           Old conflict 
 Number of conflict victims 
        Dead                                                                ……………..people 
       Injured                                                              ………………people 
       Material damage (thousands of rupiah)                Rp…………….. 
 
Was the conflict resolved peacefully? 
Yes                          No 
 
If yes, who resolved the conflict? 











Ya       - 1 
Tidak   - 2 
Tren kejahatan dibanding satu 
tahun yang lalu (Jika Kol.2 =1) 
Menurun                - 1  
Sama saja             - 2 
Meningkat              - 3 
Decreased/Same/Increased 






Penganiayaan/kekerasan  Torture/Violence 
Pembakaran Arson 
Perkosaan  Rape 
Narkoba  Narcotics 
Pembunuhan  Murder 
Lainnya     Other                                          




Apakah ada penduduk yang bunuh diri setahun terakhir: 
Ya -  1
Has there been a villager who committed suicide in the last year: Yes 
 
Korban bunuh diri yang terjadi setahun terakhir 

















Upaya warga menjaga keamanan selama setahun terakhir 
Membangun pos keamanan lingkungan      Ya  - 1       Tidak  - 2         
Membentuk regu penjaga keamanan lingkungan  Ya  - 1       Tidak  - 2  
Menambah jumlah anggota hansip        Ya  - 1       Tidak  - 2         
Memeriksa setiap orang asing yang masuk           Ya  - 1       Tidak  - 2     
Lainnya      Ya  -  1  Tidak  -  2 
   ( Tuliskan) 
Efforts taken by the villagers to ensure their security over the last year 
    Built a security post in their area                               Yes                          No 
    Formed a security team in their area                          Yes                       No 
    Increased the number of members in the civilian defence/security unit given 
neighbourhood patrol tasks [hansip].                                                Yes                 No 
    Investigated every alien citizen entering [the village?]  Yes                       No 
    Other………………………………………………             Yes                    No 





Neighbourhood law and order 
units 
Ada           - 1      









Kemudahan untuk mencapai 
Sangat mudah       - 1 
Mudah                   - 2  
Sulit                       - 3 
















      , 
      , 
 
 
1709  Jumlah anggota hansip di desa/kelurahan ini:    …………..… orang 
Number of security post members in the village                                  ……….people 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS)  
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Table 3: Conflict Incidence by Province 
  Conflict (%)  Conflict w/ 
casualties/material 





Aceh 23.4  14.1  3.0  60.2 
North Sumatra  4.1  2.8  2.9  68.6 
West Sumatra  6.6  4.9  5.4  74.1 
Riau 5.4  3.3  3.9  61.4 
Jambi 6.0  3.4  4.7  57.7 
South Sumatra  2.3  1.5  1.6  64.5 
Bengkulu 2.6  0.9  2.0  36.7 
Lampung 3.5  2.3  3.0  64.9 
Bangka Belitung  12.3  8.8  10.4  71.8 
Jakarta 13.5  6.7  6.0  50.0 
West Java  7.9  5.7  5.5  72.5 
Central Java  5.8  3.8  4.5  65.5 
Yogya 5.0  2.5  3.9  50.0 
East Java  3.5  2.3  2.6  64.0 
Banten 3.0  1.9  2.8  62.2 
Bali 7.6  3.9  6.3  51.9 
NTB 13.8  9.5  10.7  68.6 
NTT 11.6  6.0  8.5  51.5 
West Kalimantan  4.0  1.5  3.4  38.6 
Central Kalimantan  2.4  1.3  1.7  53.1 
South Kalimantan  1.4  0.6  1.1  40.7 
East Kalimantan  4.5  2.3  3.8  51.7 
North Sulawesi  10.9  7.2  8.1  66.2 
Central Sulawesi  11.9  8.7  6.7  73.1 
South Sulawesi  5.7  3.8  3.5  66.7 
SE Sulawesi  5.6  4.0  4.5  72.4 
Gorontalo 2.4  1.1  2.1  44.4 
Maluku 15.6  9.4  8.6  60.3 
North Maluku  12.6  8.8  7.4  69.9 
Papua 3.3  1.8  2.1  52.6 
Source: PODES 2003 
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Table 7: Descriptives 
 
  Source  rural   urban   
    mean std.  Dev  mean std.dev 
Conflict  Podes  0.07 0.25 0.09 0.29 
Conflict w/ casualties/material damage reported  Podes  0.04 0.20 0.06 0.23 
Absolute Poverty: District poverty gap based on per 
capita consumption  
Susenas 
5.59 5.32 3.90 3.59 
Relative Poverty: Village poverty/district poverty –
BKKBN 
Podes 
1.01 0.53 0.90 0.64 
Inequality in Educ Attainment (sd Years Males 20-30) Census  3.39 0.44 3.66 0.38 
Change in Poverty: Increase in Nr of poor -BKKBN  Podes  0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48 
Natural disaster: earthquake, land slide or flood in past 
3 years  
Podes 
0.26 0.44 0.31 0.46 
Fraction of individuals unemployed in village   Podes  0.04 0.06 0.04 0.07 
Share of families that do not work in agriculture   Podes  0.19 0.20 0.64 0.36 
There are families who live outside village for work or 
study  
Podes 
0.96 0.19 0.98 0.15 
There are families who have moved to this village for 
work or study  
Podes 
0.67 0.47 0.90 0.30 
Share land converted to different economic use in past 
3 years  
Podes 
0.013 3.130 0.024 0.239 
Mining is main source of income in village   Podes  0.003 0.051 0.007 0.086 
Forestry is main source of income in village   Podes  0.012 0.110 0.004 0.059 
Share of private agricultural land that is non-titled   Podes  0.52 0.36 0.47 0.35 
Community land ownership structure 
reported(dummy)  
Podes 
0.26 0.44 0.38 0.49 
More than one ethnic group in the village   Podes  0.59 0.49 0.86 0.35 
More than one religion in the kecamatan   Podes  0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 
Nr of places of worship in village / nr of families in 
village  
Podes 
0.018 0.016 0.010 0.008 
Ethnically Diverse Sub-District (Theil measure)   Census  0.70 0.70 1.17 0.82 
Clustering of ethnic groups across villages in 
kecamatan  
Census 
0.28 0.16 0.18 0.13 
Largest ethnic group in kec has pop share less 40%   Census  0.10 0.30 0.27 0.44 
Horizontal inequality: (Max/Min Group HH Head 
Education in Kecamatan)  
Census 
111.07 29.46  113.91 20.66 
There are marriages across ethnicity in this village   Podes  0.63 0.48 0.84 0.37 
There is no BPD - elected village council - in the 
village  
Podes 
0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 
Village leader is female   Podes  0.02 0.14 0.04 0.20 
There are religious groups in the village   Podes  0.07 0.26 0.09 0.29 
There are traditional (adat) institutions in the village   Podes  0.39 0.49 0.32 0.47 
Community security organization exists in village   Podes  0.84 0.37 0.94 0.24 
Distance to nearest police post   Podes  11.23 16.99 3.58  9.29 
 
 Table 8: Estimation Results 


















Regional  Dummies  Yes Yes  No  No No No No No 
Absolute Poverty: 
District poverty gap 
based on per capita 
consumption SU 
0.007 0.015  0.030  0.043  0.001 0.014 -0.120  0.056 





0.009  -0.085  0.023  -0.112 -0.004 -0.086 -0.083  -0.119 
  (0.15)  (0.90)  (0.42)  (1.14) (0.05) (0.92) (0.35)  (0.39) 
Inequality in Educ 
Attainment (sd Years 
Males 20-30) CE 
0.308  -0.151  0.229  -0.188 0.025 -0.188 -0.167  -0.379 
  (2.72)**  (0.63) (2.14)* (0.95) (0.16) (0.81) (0.47)  (1.16) 
Change in Poverty: 
Increase in Nr of poor 
PO-BKKBN 
0.113 0.168  0.137  0.178  0.133 0.159 -0.038  -0.229 
  (1.96)  (1.61) (2.34)* (1.70)  (1.78)  (1.53)  (0.24)  (1.05) 
Natural disaster: 
earthquake, land slide 
or flood in past 3 
years PO 
0.289 0.435  0.275  0.353  0.278 0.390 0.497  0.102 
  (4.48)**  (3.77)**  (4.27)**  (3.18)** (3.13)** (3.39)** (3.18)**  (0.45) 
Fraction of 
individuals 
unemployed in village 
PO 
1.092 1.378  1.192  1.800  0.923 1.448 0.126  1.906 
 (3.02)**  (2.29)*  (3.25)**  (2.96)**  (1.90) (2.45)* (0.09) (1.11) 
Share of families that 
do not work in 
agriculture PO 
0.099 0.262  0.222  -0.050  0.080  0.118  -0.568  0.556 
  (0.67)  (1.24)  (1.61)  (0.26) (0.45) (0.56) (1.46)  (0.66) 
There are families 
who live outside 
village for work or 
study PO 
0.420 0.677  0.442  0.614 0.610 0.614    1.938 
  (2.09)*  (1.37) (2.23)* (1.28)  (2.73)**  (1.35)  (1.84) 
There are families 
who have moved to 
this village for work 
or study PO 
0.295 -0.001  0.288  0.034 0.257  -0.002  0.244  0.310 
  (4.50)**  (0.00)  (4.35)**  (0.18) (3.08)** (0.01)  (1.29)  (1.53) 
Share land converted 
to different economic 
use in past 3 years PO 
0.587 0.750  0.471  0.412  0.458 0.765 0.405  2.121 
  (1.99)* (1.39)  (1.59)  (0.73) (1.42) (1.43) (0.47)  (2.26)* 
Mining is main source 
of income in village 
PO 
0.063 0.511  0.126  0.491  0.114 0.509 2.793   
 (0.17)  (0.94)  (0.39)  (0.78)  (0.30)  (0.93)  (4.73)**   
Forestry is main 
source of income in 
village PO 
-0.404   -0.565   -0.344     0.986 
 (1.08)    (1.52)    (1.11)      (0.81) 
Share  of  private  0.110  -0.179  0.112  -0.440 0.181 -0.115 -0.141  0.517 Table 8: Estimation Results (cont) 
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agricultural land that 
is non-titled PO 




-0.170  -0.120  -0.155  -0.196 -0.257 -0.095 -0.100 0.577 
  (1.80)  (0.92)  (1.70)  (1.40) (2.33)* (0.73)  (0.34) (1.51) 
More than one ethnic 
group in the village 
PO 
0.019 -0.056  -0.009  0.003 0.060  -0.077  -0.202  0.018 
  (0.27)  (0.31)  (0.12)  (0.02) (0.80) (0.45) (0.93)  (0.08) 
More than one 
religion in the 
kecamatan PO 
-0.044  0.103  0.190  0.330 -0.161 0.088 -0.965  -0.329 
 (0.41)  (0.61)  (2.06)*  (2.15)*  (1.40) (0.53) (1.75)  (1.17) 
Nr of places of 
worship in village / nr 
of families in village 
PO 
-24.390 -10.588  -27.249  -18.618 -17.331 -10.684 -10.811  -
41.320 




-0.027  -0.050  -0.073  0.193 -0.271 -0.057 -1.369 0.849 
 (0.23)  (0.33)  (0.83)  (1.39)  (1.99)*  (0.39)  (1.76)  (2.09)* 
Clustering of ethnic 
groups across villages 
in kecamatan CE 
1.497 0.537  1.442  0.662  0.927 0.503 0.320  -0.372 
  (5.02)** (0.85)  (4.57)**  (0.89) (2.41)* (0.87)  (0.26) (0.39) 
Largest ethnic group 
in kec has pop share 
less 40% CE 
0.302 0.363  0.314  0.078  0.437 0.411    -0.326 
  (1.90)  (1.75) (2.09)* (0.32) (2.15)*  (1.97)*    (0.64) 
Horizontal inequality: 
(Max/Min Group HH 
Head Education in 
Kecamatan) CE 
-0.004  -0.005 -0.006 -0.005  -0.002  -0.004  0.004  -0.008 
 (2.43)*  (1.61)  (3.17)**  (1.37) (0.99) (1.29) (0.54)  (0.76) 
There are marriages 
across ethnicity in this 
village PO 
0.253 0.269  0.268  0.411  0.127 0.229 0.783  0.536 
 (3.34)**  (1.52)  (3.43)**  (2.35)* (1.63)  (1.33)  (4.21)**  (1.86) 
There is no BPD - 
elected village council 
- in the village PO 
-0.080   -0.242   0.189    0.536  -1.711 
  (0.71)    (2.18)*   (1.13)  (1.62)  (1.64) 
Village leader is 
female PO 
-0.364  0.010 -0.339 0.142  -0.346  0.028  -0.958  -0.824 
  (2.24)*  (0.05) (2.14)* (0.68)  (2.17)* (0.13)  (1.59) (0.68) 
There are religious 
groups in the village 
PO 
0.243 0.274  0.242  0.352  0.248 0.290 0.232  0.483 
 (2.82)**  (1.85)  (2.79)**  (2.38)* (2.85)** (1.96)*  (1.09)  (1.64) 
There are traditional 
(adat) institutions in 
the village PO 
0.234 0.248  0.295  0.295  0.294 0.168 0.434  0.560 
 (3.08)**  (1.92)  (4.21)**  (2.56)* (2.93)**  (1.32)  (1.99)*  (1.94) 
Community security 
organization exists in 
village PO 
-0.217  -0.027  -0.119  -0.321 -0.341 -0.198 -0.643  -0.188 
  (2.26)*  (0.13)  (1.14)  (1.10) (2.09)* (0.99)  (1.42) (0.86) Table 8: Estimation Results (cont) 
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Distance to nearest 
police post PO 
-0.008  -0.007  -0.006  -0.003 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005  -0.028 




0.422 0.290  0.445  0.108  0.330 0.252 0.564   
Constant  -9.087  -5.176  -7.691  -3.285 -7.280 -3.857 -6.519  -3.393 
 (11.96)**  (3.98)**  (11.86)**  (2.66)** (8.74)** (2.93)** (2.96)** (2.12)* 
Observations  53435  6454  53435  6454 56695 6549  7527 2140 
Pseudo  R2  0.0801  0.1009  0.0543  0.0483 0.1362 0.0971 0.0590  0.0916 
Robust z statistics in 
parentheses 
            
* significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1% 
            
 
Robust  z  statistics  in  parentheses          
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%            
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Figure 1: District Incidence of Conflict 
(% Total Communities Reporting by District (Kabupaten/Kota) 
 